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Individuals often have low rates of compliance with treatment recommendations. We 
examined the role that experienced affect at the time of illness diagnosis might play in 
influencing thoughts and feelings relating treatment compliance. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to receive a positive, neutral, or negative affect induction after imagin-
ing they were diagnosed with kidney cancer. They then reported on thoughts and feel-
ings about the illness and the treatment regimen. Participants also reported interest in 
additional information about the illness and behavioral intentions for complying with 
the treatment regimen. Affect significantly influenced interest in information and be-
havioral intentions. Both effects were mediated by the influence of affect on partici-
pants’ self-efficacy beliefs. These mediational findings support a mood-as-resource in-
terpretation of the role of affect in treatment compliance. 
 
Diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes are pressing public-health 
problems in the United States. Mortality from these three diseases collectively 
accounts for just over 50% of all deaths in the U.S. each year (Arias, Anderson, 
Kung, Murphy, & Kochanek, 2003). Because of the public-health significance of 
morbidity and mortality from these diseases, there is a great deal of research fo-
cused on developing new and better ways to treat these illnesses. 
Many of these treatments involve ongoing behavioral action on the part of the 
individual patient (e.g., compliance with pharmaceutical regimens, ongoing physi-
cal activity guidelines, changes in dietary intake). However, across a variety of 
treatments, people have remarkably low rates of adherence with the recommenda-
tions that they receive (World Health Organization, 2003). For example, at best, 
about 60% of heart-attack patients follow medication protocols 6 months after the 
incident (Butler et al., 2002; see also Burke & Ockene, 2001; Sackett & Snow, 
1979). 
1 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Darnell Schuettler, Northern Ari-
zona University, South San Francisco Street, Flagstaff, AZ 86011. E-mail: dschuettler@hotmail.com
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Because treatment strategies for many illnesses rely heavily on patient behav-
iors, given the evidence for low compliance with regimens, it is of great relevance 
to understand the factors involved in individuals’ choices about complying with 
those treatment regimens. For many individuals, their first time considering and 
making choices about treatment-related behaviors comes when they receive an 
initial illness diagnosis from their physician. Understanding factors that influence 
how a patient reacts to the diagnosis and how those reactions relate to behavioral 
choices, therefore, may play a significant role in both understanding treatment-
related behaviors and improving initial care for individuals diagnosed with serious 
illnesses. 
Affect and Reactions to Diagnoses 
Although a variety of factors may influence individuals’ choices about behav-
ioral options (Bowen, Helmes, & Lease, 2001), an area that potentially may play a 
role is the individual’s affective state at the time of diagnosis and initial considera-
tion of treatment options. There are at least two reasons why the role of affect in 
response to an illness diagnosis may be important. First, being diagnosed with a 
serious illness often is associated (not surprisingly) with strong negative affect 
(e.g., Tedstone & Tarrier, 2003), and individuals experience aversive emotional 
responses to even relatively mild information about risk for health problems (for a 
discussion, see Ditto & Croyle, 1995). Documented negative affective reactions to 
serious illness include anxiety (Popkin, Callies, Lentz, Colon, & Sutherland, 
1988), depression (Epping-Jordan et al., 1999), and guilt (Taylor, Lichtman, & 
Wood, 1984). Although such emotional reactions may occur at multiple points 
during the course of an illness, they often are particularly pronounced during the 
initial period after an illness diagnosis when one is coming to terms with the diag-
nosis and making decisions about how to respond (Moos, 1977). 
Although the variety of negative emotional responses to diagnosis and their 
likely concentration at the initial stages of diagnosis and treatment initiation alone 
make examining their effects important, there are further reasons to expect emo-
tions to have an important influence on illness responses. Affective responses 
have been shown to have significant influences on individuals’ thoughts, decision 
making, and outcomes in a variety of areas, including decisions about health in-
formation (for reviews, see Aspinwall, 1998; Lowenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
How might affect influence a person’s reactions to health diagnoses? There are 
a number of possible mechanisms by which affect might have an influence. Inter-
estingly, across these mechanisms, one can find support for the notion that posi-
tive affect will lead to more adaptive responses to illness diagnoses (e.g., interest  
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in learning more about the disorder and how to treat it, intention to follow a treat-
ment regimen), but also can find strong support for the opposite prediction: that 
negative affect will lead to more adaptive responses. 
In support of the idea that greater positive affect experienced when considering 
an illness diagnosis and treatment options is research demonstrating that positive 
affect is associated with increased interest in and attention to potentially threaten-
ing information about the self and health status. For example. Trope and Neter 
(1994) examined the role of affect on willingness to seek and accept negative 
feedback. Those in positive affective states show greater willingness to attend to 
negative information (see also Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Isen & Patrick, 
1983). In this perspective, positive affect serves as a resource allowing individuals 
the freedom to attend to threatening information. Thus, we might expect individu-
als in positive affective states to be more willing to attend to information related to 
a diagnosis of a serious illness and associated treatment options, and thus to be 
more likely to respond in adaptive ways to the diagnosis. 
Not only has positive affect been shown to influence interest in and attention 
to information, it also has been shown to increase individuals’ perceptions of their 
ability to deal successfully with potentially threatening situations. Both disposi-
tional optimism and positive affect have been linked to higher self-efficacy beliefs 
in a variety of situations and stronger perceptions of response efficacy (Cozzarelli, 
1993; Desharnais et al., 1990; Taylor et al., 1992). Given these findings, one 
might posit that positive affect could make adaptive responses to a serious illness 
diagnosis more likely by increasing perceptions of both self and response efficacy 
for following treatment regimens. Because self and response efficacy make engag-
ing in a behavior more likely (Ajzen, 1985; Bandura, 1986), one might then ex-
pect that greater levels of positive affect following an illness diagnosis would be 
associated with more adaptive thoughts and behaviors related to the illness and to 
treatment options. 
Although there are several lines of evidence that might lead one to hypothesize 
that individuals experiencing positive affect when receiving an illness diagnosis 
and considering treatment options would have more adaptive responses, there is 
also evidence to suggest that the opposite might be true. Other lines of work sup-
port the notion that negative affect might engender more adaptive responses to a 
potentially threatening situation. 
One possibility is that negative affect at the time of diagnosis might influence 
perceptions of concern for the problem. In other domains, it has been shown that 
individuals can use affective associations to infer how risky a situation is or how 
concerned they should be (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). This notion is also the foundation for the 
use of fear arousal as a technique for motivating behavioral change: To the extent 
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that fear is associated with a situation or health threat, individuals may be more 
motivated to take action to alleviate that threat (Leventhal, 1970). Thus, negative 
affect aroused by an illness diagnosis might influence both individuals’ interpreta-
tion of their concern about the situation and their subsequent decisions about 
treatment options. 
Second, some work has shown that, relative to individuals in a positive mood, 
individuals experiencing negative affective states are more likely to process in-
formation thoroughly and systematically (Kuykendall & Keating, 1990; Worth & 
Mackie, 1987). Thus, one might expect the degree of negative affect aroused 
when receiving a diagnosis and considering treatment options to increase the like-
lihood of fully processing information and to promote interest in additional infor-
mation about the health problem and treatment options. 
Study Overview 
There are a variety of ways in which affective states might influence an indi-
vidual’s response to an illness diagnosis. Of particular interest is that the past lit-
erature has led to opposing predictions for the adaptive role of positive and nega-
tive affect in diagnosis. Given this and the potential importance of individuals’ 
initial responses for coping with the illness and carrying out treatment regimens, 
the present study is designed to examine how individuals’ affective states when 
considering treatment options will influence cognitive and behavioral responses to 
the diagnosis. Because past literature not only has generated opposing predictions 
for whether positive or negative affect will lead to more adaptive responses but 
also posits different pathways through which affect might influence outcomes 
(e.g., altering efficacy beliefs, changing perceptions of seriousness and concern), 
we also assess the relevant social cognitive constructs that the past literature sug-
gests may be influenced by affect. 
In order to examine these questions about the role of affect in response to a di-
agnosis of a serious health problem, we conducted a study in which participants 
were placed in a positive, negative, or neutral affective state after imagining hav-
ing been informed of a diagnosis of a serious health problem. After the affect in-
duction, we assessed several facets of participants’ psychological response to the 
diagnosis and behavioral intention with regard to treatment options. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 76 introductory psychology students from a large, mid-
western university (65 female, 11 male; M age = 20.1 years). The students took 
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part in the study in exchange for extra course credit. Participants were predomi-
nantly single (90%) and Caucasian (80%). 
 
Procedure 
Health-diagnosis scenario. Participants were told that the study concerns how 
people respond to health information, and their thoughts and feelings about that 
information. They were told that they would read a scenario about a health situa-
tion and would answer some questions about their response to the information. 
First, participants received a written scenario about a visit to a doctor’s office. 
They were asked to imagine that the events described in the scenario were actually 
occurring and that they were the patient in the scenario. In the scenario, partici-
pants were asked to imagine that they had not been feeling well. The scenario then 
described a visit to the doctor in which the doctor performed an examination and a 
series of laboratory tests, including special x-rays. 
Following the tests, the doctor informed the patient that he or she had been di-
agnosed with renal cell cancer. The doctor then suggested that the patient undergo 
surgery to remove the cancerous area, as well as 6 to 7 weeks of radiation therapy 
either before or after the surgery. At this point, the patient was then presented with 
information about renal cell cancer. This information included a description of 
renal cell cancer and the variety of treatment options available.2 
Affect induction. After completing the scenario task, participants were ran-
domly assigned to receive either a positive, negative, or neutral affect induction. 
The appropriate affective state was induced using Velten’s (1968) mood-induction 
procedure. As a cover story, participants were told that they were to complete a 
cognitive skills task. They were asked to read aloud a series of statements and to 
concentrate to the best of their ability on each statement. 
Each participant read aloud a series of 30 statements. The positive affect in-
duction included statements such as “I feel lighthearted” and “For the rest of the 
day, I bet things will go really well.” The negative affect induction included 
statements such as “My life is so tiresome—the same old thing day after day de-
presses me” and “It seems that no matter how hard I try, things still go wrong.” 
The neutral induction included statements such as “The mansion was rented by the 
delegation” and “Slang is a constantly changing part of the language.” 
Velten’s (1968) mood-induction procedure has been used successfully in a va-
riety of studies as a means of inducing particular affective states (Bartolic, Basso, 
 
 
2 The information that was presented was adapted from WebMD (2003). 
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Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic-Schefft, 1999; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2003; 
for a review, see Larsen & Sinnett, 1991). Moreover, although some have ques-
tioned the transparency of the procedure (e.g., Kenealy, 1986), methodological 
work with the Velten technique has demonstrated that effects are not simply a 
result of demand characteristics (e.g., Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1986; Finegan & 
Seligman, 1995) and that the induction technique is a valid way of producing posi-
tive and negative mood states (Larsen & Sinnett, 1991). During debriefing, no 
participants expressed suspicion about the procedure. 
 
Dependent Variables 
After completing the affect induction, participants were given a demographics 
sheet and a short, open-ended test of renal cell cancer knowledge. This test served 
as a filler task to decrease suspicion by allowing a time lag between the affect 
induction and the dependent variable measures. Next, participants completed a 
measure of current affect, which served as a manipulation check.3 
Participants then completed a questionnaire containing measures of partici-
pants’ motivation to overcome renal cell cancer, their self-appraisals, their beliefs 
about illness severity and impact, and their beliefs about engaging in potential 
treatments (see Measures). After completing the measures, participants were de-
briefed fully. Participants in the negative and neutral affect conditions also were 
given the opportunity to have a positive mood induced, although none took advan-
tage of the offer. 
 
Measures 
Demographics and information check. Participants reported their gender, age, 
ethnicity, and marital status.4 The open-ended test section assessed participants’ 
knowledge of the definition of renal cell cancer, recall of symptoms of renal cell 
cancer, number of stages of renal cell cancer, what stage the scenario described, 
and recall of the treatment suggested by the physician. 
Manipulation-check affect measure. As a manipulation check, affective state 
was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
dark, & Tellegen, 1988), a highly reliable measure of positive and negative affect 
(positive, α  = .89; negative, α = .92). The PANAS consists of a list of 20 emo- 
 
 
3 Because repeated affect measures can sensitize participants to the measurement tool 
and thus change the nature of their responses, we chose not to assess pre-manipulation af-
fect (see Campbell & Stanley. 1966). 
4 Demographic characteristics did not influence any reported results. 
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tional states (10 positive, e.g., “excited”; and 10 negative, e.g., “distressed”). 
For each emotional state, participants rated the extent to which they were cur-
rently experiencing the state. Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The means of the posi-
tive and negative items served as measures of post-manipulation positive and 
negative affect. 
Outcome variables. Items measuring decision-making constructs in the context 
of a serious illness diagnosis were developed and used to assess factors involved 
in decision making about the illness diagnosis and treatment options.5 Several 
constructs related to decision making for health behavior were assessed, as were 
two behavioral intention constructs: interest in acquiring additional information 
about the illness, and intention to follow the suggested treatment regimen. 
To avoid the possibility of assessment of earlier constructs altering par-
ticipants’ assessment of subsequent constructs (for a discussion, see Schwarz, 
1999; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001), items related to each construct were distrib-
uted randomly through the questionnaire. For each outcome construct, the mean of 
the individual items related to that construct was used to create a composite meas-
ure. All questions were answered using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
We assessed four constructs related to cognitions about the illness and 
treatment. The self-appraisals measure includes five items assessing individu-
als’ perceptions of their ability to cope with cancer, to follow the treatment 
regimen successfully, and to overcome the illness (e.g., “How capable are you 
of following the treatment regimen?”; α = .90). The concern measure includes 
six items related to anxiety and concern about the illness, perceptions of ill-
ness severity, and concern about the proposed treatments (e.g., “How severe 
do you perceive your illness to be?”; α = .63). The health-perceptions measure 
includes three items assessing the likelihood of being healthy following the 
cancer treatment (e.g., “How easy do you think it will be to return to a healthy 
state of life?”; α = .78). Finally, the impact measure includes three items as-
sessing how much of an impact the individual thinks the illness and treatment 
will have on daily life (e.g., “How much of an impact will this illness have on 
your life within the next year?”; α = .55). 
 
 
5 To our knowledge, there are no existing published measures for these constructs in the 
context of serious illness. Therefore, we developed items to measure these constructs. Al-
though items were created a priori, we ran an exploratory factor analysis to examine 
whether our individual items covaried as expected, based on their division into constructs. 
The exploratory factor analysis confirmed the expected relations between individual items 
measuring a construct. 
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Finally, we measured two aspects of behavioral intention with regard to treat-
ment for kidney cancer. First, the information interest measure includes two items 
related to interest in learning more about the illness and the treatment (e.g., “How 
interested are you in learning more about your illness?”; α = .93). Second, the 
treatment behavioral intentions measure includes three items examining intention 
to follow the treatment regimen and intended effort to be exerted to follow the 
treatment and to overcome the illness (e.g., “How much effort are you going to 
put into following your treatment regimen?”; α = .93). 
Results 
Overview of Analyses 
To examine how affect experienced when considering an illness diagnosis in-
fluences cognitive and affective reactions to treatment, we first examined how the 
affect manipulation influenced both interest in additional information about the 
illness and intention to follow treatment regimens. In addition, we examined the 
influence of affect on decision-making constructs that past literature has suggested 
might be influenced by affect (e.g., self-efficacy). 
For each of these variables, we began by examining overall differences as a re-
sult of the manipulation using an omnibus ANOVA strategy. For variables where 
the overall ANOVA revealed significant between-group differences, we con-
ducted follow-up tests using Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) test to 
examine the nature of these differences.6 
 
Affect Manipulation Check 
Prior to examining the relationship between mood and responses to cancer di-
agnosis and treatment recommendations, we first assessed whether our manipula-
tion successfully induced the desired affective states in participants. Examination 
of the positive and negative affect scales shows that participants in the positive 
mood condition reported the highest positive mood (M = 2.79, SD = 0.77) and the 
lowest negative mood (M = 1.64, SD = 0.71), followed by those in the neutral 
condition (positive M = 2.47, SD = 0.72; negative M = 1.96, SD = 0.98). Those 
 
 
6 Control of error rates is an issue of concern when conducting follow-up tests. How-
ever, when there are no more than three means to be compared, as long as the omnibus F 
test in the ANOVA is significant, the error rate for the follow-up tests is held at the overall 
alpha value (for a discussion, see Howell, 1997). Because LSD provides the greatest statis-
tical power for testing follow-up hypotheses with a significant omnibus test (Carmer & 
Swanson, 1973), we elected to use it for our follow-up tests. 
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in the negative mood condition showed the lowest positive mood (M = 2.02, SD = 
0.64) and the highest negative mood (M = 2.26, SD = 0.55): positive mood, F(2, 
73) = 7.50, p < .01; negative mood, F(2, 73) = 3.38, p < .05. The mean effect size 
for the mood condition (positive or negative) versus control condition comparison 
in these data was d = .44. Interestingly, this effect size is nearly identical to the 
meta-analytic mean effect size for Velten’s (1968) mood-induction studies using a 
cover story (d = .46; Larsen & Sinnett, 1991). 
Follow-up analyses using Fisher’s LSD (minimum M difference = 0.40) re-
veals that for the positive mood measure, those who completed the negative mood 
induction had significantly lower scores than did either the positive or the neutral 
groups (M differences = 0.78 and 0.46, respectively). The positive and neutral 
mood conditions did not differ significantly on the positive mood measure, al-
though the means are in the right direction (M difference = 0.32). For the negative 
mood measure, those in the negative mood induction condition had significantly 
higher negative moods than did those in the positive mood condition (M differ-
ence = 0.62). The other two comparisons were not significantly different, although 
in all cases, the means were in the right direction (positive-neutral M difference = 
0.32; negative-neutral M difference = 0.30). 
 
Affect and Cognitive Beliefs Following Cancer Diagnosis 
Having established that the manipulation induced the desired patterns of affec-
tive states, we next turn to examining how affect influenced participants’ 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions about the illness. Means by condition for each 
belief variable are summarized in Table 1. 
First, participants in the positive affect condition had higher self-appraisals 
(M= 5.78, SD = 0.80) than did participants in the negative affect condition (M= 
4.81, SD = 1.30), whereas neutral condition participants fell in between the two 
(M = 5.69, SD = 0.88), F(2, 73) = 6.86, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons using LSD 
(with a minimum M difference of 0.57) reveals that those experiencing negative 
affect tended to have lower self-appraisals than did either those experiencing posi-
tive affect (M difference = 0.96) or neutral affect (M difference = 0.88). However, 
the difference in self-appraisals between those in positive and neutral moods was 
not significant (M difference = 0.08). 
Next, participants in the positive affect condition demonstrated lower levels of 
concern about the diagnosis (M = 3.90, SD = 0.66) than did participants in either 
the neutral or the negative condition (neutral, M =4.37, SD = 0.74; negative, M = 
4.34, SD = 0.80), F(2, 73) = 3.39, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons using LSD (with 
a minimum M difference of 0.41) reveal that those in both the neutral and negative 
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Table 1 
Cognitive and Behavioral Variables by Affect Condition 
 
                                        Positive affect      Neutral affect      Negative affect 
 
Variable M SD M SD M SD 
Cognitive variables       
Self-appraisal 5.78 a 0.80 5.69 a 0.88 4.81 b 1.31 
Concern 3.90 a 0.66 4.37 b 0.74 4.34 b 0.80 
Health perceptions 5.01 a 1.05 4.44 b 0.89 3.75c 1.08 
Impact 5.39 a 1.08 5.64 a 0.71 5.60 a 0.70 
Behavioral intentions       
Information interest 6.31 a b 1.21 6.68 a 0.56 5.85 b 1.13 
Treatment intentions 6.55 a 0.76 6.60a 0.54 5.97 b 1.20 
Note. Different subscripts indicate significantly different means. 
 
 
conditions were more concerned than were those in the positive condition (nega-
tive-positive difference = 0.44; neutral-positive difference = 0.47). However, there 
was no difference between those in negative moods and those in neutral moods (M 
difference = 0.03). 
There also were significant effects of mood on health perceptions. Those in the 
positive condition displayed more positive health perceptions (M = 5.01, SD= 
1.10), than did those in the neutral condition (M = 4.44, SD = 0.89). Those in the 
negative condition displayed the worst health perceptions (M = 3.75, SD = 1.10), 
F(2, 73) = 9.98, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons using LSD (with a minimum M 
difference of 0.57) reveal that those with positive moods had higher health percep-
tions than did either those in neutral moods (M difference = 0.57) or negative 
moods (M difference = 1.26). Those in neutral moods also had higher health per-
ceptions than did those in negative moods (M difference = 0.69). 
The only exception to the strong role of affect in determining beliefs about ill-
ness was the measure of impact. There were no significant mean differences in the 
amount of perceived impact across the conditions (positive, M = 5.39, SD = 1.10; 
neutral, M = 5.64, SD =0.71; negative, M = 5.60, SD = 0.70), F(2, 73) = 0.61, ns. 
Given that the omnibus F test was not significant, no follow-up tests were con-
ducted for impact. 
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Treatment Behavioral Intentions 
Next, we examined the role that the affect manipulation played in determining 
individual’s behavioral intentions with regard to the diagnosis. For the measure of 
information interest, those in the positive mood condition reported greater interest 
than did those in the negative mood condition (positive, M = 6.31, SD = 1.20; 
negative, M = 5.85, SD = 1.10). Interestingly, those in the neutral condition re-
ported the greatest interest in additional information (M = 6.68, SD = 0.56), F(2, 
73) = 4.09, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons using LSD (with a minimum M differ-
ence of 0.57) reveal that there was no difference in information interest between 
positive and negative affect (M difference = 0.46), or between positive and neutral 
affect (M difference = 0.37). However, those in neutral moods were more inter-
ested in additional information than were those in negative moods (M difference = 
0.83). 
Finally, participants in the positive and neutral mood conditions displayed 
higher treatment-related behavioral intentions (positive, M = 6.55, SD = 0.76; neu-
tral, M = 6.60, SD = 0.54) than did those in the negative mood condition (M = 
5.97, SD = 1.20), F(2, 73) = 3.75, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons using LSD (with 
a minimum M difference of 0.49) reveal that those in both positive and neutral 
moods showed no difference in their intentions (M difference = 0.05), and that 
negative moods showed significantly lower intentions than did either positive (M 
difference = 0.56) or neutral moods (M difference = 0.62). 
Process Analysis: Why Does Affect Influence Behavioral Intentions? 
Having established the effects of the affect manipulation on each dependent 
variable, mediation analyses were conducted to examine whether the cognitive 
aspects of diagnosis response can account for the relations observed between af-
fect and both information interest and treatment behavioral intentions. In other 
words, do cognitive response variables mediate the relations between affect and 
behavioral outcome variables? 
Conceptually, analysis of mediation rests on four core criteria (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Hoyle & Robinson, 2004). First, the independent variable (affect) 
must be related to the dependent variable (information interest, behavioral inten-
tion). Second, the mediating variable (self-appraisal, concern, health perceptions) 
must relate to the dependent variable. Third, the independent variable must be 
related to the mediating variable. Finally, to conclude that an effect is mediated, 
the strength of the independent variable-dependent variable (IV-DV) must be at-
tenuated when the mediated variable is included in the model. 
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We already have demonstrated the first and third criteria in the ANOVA analy-
ses reported earlier. To test the second assumption—that the mediating variable is 
related to the dependent variable—we examined the correlations between each 
hypothesized mediator and the two dependent variables. Each of the hypothesized 
mediators was related to behavioral intention (self-appraisal, r = .71; concern, r = 
–.23; health appraisal, r = .39; ps < .05). For information interest, both self-
appraisals (r = .39) and health perceptions (r = .23) were related significantly (p < 
.05). However, concern was not significantly related (r = .19, ns). 
Because our independent variable is a multilevel categorical variable, we used 
the ANCOVA strategy described by Hoyle and Robinson (2004) to test for the 
final mediational assumption. ANCOVA involves controlling for a variable (the 
covariate) prior to examining the relation between a categorical independent vari-
able and a continuous dependent variable. Given this, we can test whether our 
hypothesized mediators actually reduce the strength of the IV-DV relation by 
comparing the strength of the relation in the ANOVAs reported earlier to the 
strength of the relation in an ANCOVA in which the hypothesized mediator is 
included as a covariate. 
We first examined the extent to which each of the two plausible cognitive me-
diators predicted interest in additional information (because concern was not re-
lated to information interest in our analysis, it was not tested for mediation). We 
found that self-appraisals fully mediated the relation between affect and informa-
tion interest. When self-appraisal was included in the model, the af-
fect/information-interest relationship dropped to nonsignificant, F(2, 72) =1.93, 
ns. Health perceptions attenuated the relation somewhat, but did not demonstrate 
evidence for full mediation, F(2, 72) = 3.07, p < .05. Without the hypothesized 
mediators in the model, the relation was as follows: F(2, 73) = 4.09, p < .05. 
We then examined the three hypothesized mediators of the affect/ behavioral-
intention relationship. Here, too, self-appraisals mediated the relation, F(2, 72) = 
1.07, ns. Health perceptions also mediated the relation, F(2, 72)= 1.89, ns. Con-
cern did not show any evidence of mediating the relation, F(2, 72) = 3.22, p < .05. 
Without the hypothesized mediators in the model, the relation was as follows: F(2, 
73) = 3.07, p < .05. 
Because both self-appraisal and health perceptions appeared to mediate the re-
lation between affect and behavioral intentions significantly, we further probed 
the nature of the interrelations between these variables. Examination of the self-
appraisal/health-perception relation reveals that the two were strongly related (r 
=.71, p < .001). Given this strong relation, it is possible that both appear to be 
mediators because of their shared variance. To examine this possibility, we esti-
mated a final ANCOVA model in which both self-appraisal and health percep-
tions were included as covariates in the model. In this analysis, where shared 
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variance was controlled, only self-appraisal showed evidence of being a covariate: 
self-appraisal/behavioral-intention relation, F(l, 71) = 50.03, p < .001; health-
perception/behavioral-intention relation, F(l, 71) = 2.24, ns, and with the covari-
ates in the model, F(2, 71) = 0.49, ns. 
 
Discussion 
The present study was designed to examine the relationship between one’s af-
fective state and the thoughts, feelings, and behavioral intentions associated with a 
diagnosis of a serious health problem. Our results show that affect influenced in-
dividual’s reactions to such a diagnosis. Compared to those in a negative mood, 
individuals who were in a positive mood experienced less anxiety about the ill-
ness, showed higher levels of perceived self-efficacy, had greater expectations for 
fully recovering from the illness, were more interested in additional information, 
and reported being more likely to follow the treatment regimens. Moreover, when 
we examined potential mediators of the affect/behavioral-intention relationship, 
we found that self-appraisal, expectations, and concern about the illness all were 
mediators through which affect influenced behavioral intention. Of the dependent 
variables we examined, only perceived impact of the illness was not influenced by 
the affect manipulation. 
Understanding Affect and Treatment Behaviors 
In particular, the mediational analyses in our study provide support for the 
mood-as-resource interpretation of affect’s influence on treatment behaviors de-
scribed in the introduction. Our mediational results reveal that the relation be-
tween affect and behavioral intention can be accounted for completely by a model 
in which beliefs about self-efficacy serve as a mediator of the affect/behavioral-
intention relation. In other words, the affect experienced at the time of the illness 
diagnosis influences self-perceptions of ability to successfully overcome the ill-
ness. In turn, those self-perceptions influence the likelihood that the newly diag-
nosed patient will form strong behavioral intentions to follow the treatment regi-
men and to overcome the illness. 
Our main effects analyses demonstrate that, relative to those in a neutral mood, 
positive mood raised and negative mood lowered perceptions of self-efficacy. 
Thus, positive mood seems to serve as a self-related resource, providing buffering 
against the negative effects of the illness diagnosis, which in turn allows the indi-
vidual to feel sufficiently efficacious to carry out treatment behaviors that increase 
the likelihood of a successful recovery from the health problem. By contrast, 
negative affect depletes resources, lowering perceptions of self-efficacy; thus, 
making compliance with treatment regimens less likely. 
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This finding is consistent with the perspective that positive mood serves as a 
psychological resource (e.g., Aspinwall, 1988; Isen, 2003). Under this perspective, 
positive affect provides self-enhancement. The positive self-related feelings en-
gendered by self-enhancement, in turn, provide the individual the freedom to at-
tend to potentially threatening information (e.g., Trope & Neter, 1994) and to en-
gage in necessary coping steps to respond to threats (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 
1997). 
In our findings, the positive-affect-condition participants were more likely to 
be interested in additional information about the threatening health problem and 
had stronger behavioral intentions to respond to the problem. Both of these effects 
were mediated by increased feelings of self-efficacy in the positive-affect condi-
tion. This provides evidence for the mood-as-resource perspective of positive af-
fect. By contrast, our findings do not support a fear-appeals perspective on the 
influence of affect on behavioral responses. The fear-appeal perspective would 
posit that negative affect would be associated with more adaptive behavioral re-
sponses by increasing perceptions of health problem seriousness and need for 
concern. Although negative affect was associated with higher concern about the 
problem, that relation did not influence participant’s behavioral intentions con-
cerning treatment options. 
Limitations 
An obvious limitation of this study is that we used an imaginary scenario to 
simulate receiving a diagnosis of renal cell cancer. For a variety of reasons, the 
thoughts and feelings elicited by this technique are likely to be weaker than those 
that would occur in an actual medical diagnosis situation. The scenario technique 
did, however, allow us to manipulate mood experimentally. For the purpose of 
examining the role of affect in treatment decision making and the cognitive 
mechanisms through which affect has its influence, we believe that an experimen-
tal design is a critical need. There are simply too many potential third variables 
that might account for an affect/ behavioral-intention relation in a naturalistic set-
ting. That said, with our experimental evidence for the causal role of affect in 
hand, follow-up studies examining the relation between affect at time of diagnosis 
and treatment behavioral decisions in naturalistic medical settings would provide 
strong corroborating evidence for our findings and evidence for its importance and 
generalizability. 
Related to the first point, although our affect manipulation significantly influ-
enced participants’ moods (those in the positive-affect induction condition had 
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the most positive and least negative moods, and so on), the overall differences in 
mood were relatively minor. Indeed, it might be best to characterize the moods 
induced by our experimental manipulation as mildly positive or negative. Al-
though this may be a limitation in that the effect of the manipulation on mood is 
relatively small, two features are important to note. First, the effect size for the 
manipulated mood differences is consistent with other studies using procedures 
similar to ours with the Velten (1968) mood-induction technique (Larsen & Sen-
nett, 1991). Second, although the impact of our induction technique was small, 
that relatively small induced mood difference caused significant differences in the 
thoughts and feelings participants had about the illness, perceptions of their own 
capabilities for dealing with the illness, and intentions for gathering additional 
information and following treatment regimens. Given that the mood experienced 
in an actual illness diagnosis and treatment decision is almost certain to be much 
stronger than that induced by our manipulation, one would expect the effect of 
mood on decision making in the case of actual illness to be significantly stronger 
than that induced by our experimental procedure. 
Another feature of our study to note is that we used generalized, nonspecific 
positive and negative affect inductions in our manipulations. Most studies in this 
area have used such manipulations. And the mood-as-resource hypothesis is based 
on generalized effects of positive affect. However, some theorists have argued 
recently that it may be important to examine how more specific emotions (e.g., 
anger or sadness, rather than simply negative affect) influence decision making 
(e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Given the evidence from these studies, it may prove 
fruitful to examine more specific emotions and their role in individual’s reactions. 
This may be particularly important for illness diagnosis, because those diagnosed 
with a serious illness often report a multitude of negative emotions (e.g., both an-
ger and sadness). 
Finally, it may be important to consider differences in affective reactions 
across illnesses that might influence responses to our questions. Survey results 
show that Americans report being more frightened by thoughts of cancer than by 
other serious health problems (National Cancer Institute, 2004). Given this, nega-
tive affective reactions to cancer might be stronger than those to other related 
health problems, and the affective patterns associated with diagnosis might differ 
across health problems in ways that could influence individual’s responses. 
Applied Implications 
The degree of positive affect experienced when considering reactions to an ill-
ness diagnosis and treatment options has a significant impact on individual’s  
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decision making. How might these findings inform healthcare practices? The re-
sults suggest that healthcare providers could aid adaptation and response to a seri-
ous illness diagnosis by increasing a patient’s positive affect. 
Although it is unrealistic to expect providers to use laboratory affect induc-
tions in a clinical setting, there may be techniques that could be used to increase 
positive affect in such settings. First, the literature on reactions to illness diagno-
ses suggest that both increasing knowledge about the health problem and percep-
tions of control over the situation are associated with lower levels of anxiety and 
depression when diagnosed with a serious illness (Egbert, Battit, Welch, & Bart-
lett, 1964; Spiegel, 1996). Educational programs that provide information and 
increase perceptions of control, therefore, might lead to affective states associated 
with more adaptive responses (Helgeson, Cohen, Schuiz, & Yasko, 2001; Meyer 
& Mark, 1995). Second, several studies of how providers’ communication of in-
formation to patients influences patient reactions have shown that presenting in-
formation in a tone that conveys optimism about outcomes (within the bounds of 
reality) is associated with greater patient satisfaction and better adjustment to the 
illness diagnosis (for reviews, see Lamont & Christakis, 2003; Silani & Boraso, 
1999). Use of such communication strategies might lead to more positive affective 
responses for patients and, therefore, to more adaptive responses to diagnosis and 
treatment options. 
Positive and negative affect substantially influence reactions to diagnosis with 
a serious health problem. Individuals in positive moods are more likely to be in-
terested in additional information about the illness and to report intentions to fol-
low treatment recommendations to overcome the illness. Moreover, these effects 
are mediated by the extent to which the individual eels self-efficacy for the behav-
iors included in treatment. Because of the negative affect often associated with a 
serious illness diagnosis, understanding the role of affect in response to illness and 
in treatment decisions and the potential importance of positive affect for adaptive 
responses is important if individuals being diagnosed with serious illness are to 
respond and adapt effectively. 
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